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Abstract We consider two bidders with asymmetric valuations competing to win an exoge-
nous prize. Capital markets are imperfect, such that the contestants possibly face a liquidity
constraint. We show that aggregate investments are lower if at least one bidder has a liq-
uidity constraint, even if the low-valuation bidder possibly increases his/her investments.
Furthermore, the effect of the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint on competitive
balance is ambiguous. However, if the low-valuation bidder is constrained, greater wealth
unambiguously increases competitive balance. Surprisingly, if the low-valuation bidder has
a constraint, a tighter constraint can increase his/her profit.
Keywords Asymmetric contests · Competitive balance · Liquidity constraints ·
Low-valuation bidder · High-valuation bidder
JEL Classification D43 · D72 · C72
1 Introduction
In many social and economic situations, agents invest resources to win a prize. Typical ap-
plications can be found in patent races, campaigns for political office, lobbying for political
rents, firms’ competition for market shares, arms races in military conflicts, music compe-
titions, and sports tournaments. Firms, for instance, invest in R&D, the education of their
employees, and infrastructure, striving for winning a contest prize. Contestants’ willingness
to invest is not a sufficient condition for actual investments. Investments crucially depend
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on contestants’ liquidity because the availability of financial resources is often limited due
to capital market imperfections.1
In this paper, we consider two contestants competing to win a prize. Contestants are
potentially liquidity-constrained. That is, their maximum investment is limited by their in-
dividual wealth. We analyze the impact of liquidity constraints on contestants’ (aggregate)
investments and on competitive balance.2 Liquidity constraints are present in numerous ex-
amples. Politicians campaigning for an elective office usually have different budgets. The
same holds for firms lobbying for political favors in a rent-seeking contest. In the private sec-
tor, firms finance their investments internally or externally. Firms that have retained earnings
in the past are less dependent on capital markets. If these markets are imperfect, firms are
possibly forced to pass up opportunities for profitable investments due to their respective
liquidity situations. In the North American sports leagues, salary caps have been introduced
to improve competitive balance. These caps restrict the teams’ payroll. Therefore, caps can
be interpreted as budget constraints for teams, especially for rich large-market teams that
can offer better wages than small-market teams (Késenne 2000: 422).
Liquidity constraints may influence the strategy of bidders. Pitchik and Schotter (1988)
show in an experimental study that budget constraints affect bidding behavior in sequential
auctions. Bidders try to exploit the constraint of their opponents. On the other hand, liq-
uidity constraints may have important welfare implications. First, politicians with budget
constraints lobbying for an elective office or firms with limited access to capital markets
seeking a governmental contract may change their investment decisions. This change has a
direct effect on rent-dissipation. Second, it is possible that a contestant with a lower prize
valuation wins the contest (solely because it has more funds). Therefore, the availability of
(financial) resources plays an important role for an efficient investment allocation.
In the literature, contest models with liquidity constraints are considered in different
frameworks; Che and Gale (1997) analyse the differences between all-pay auctions and lot-
teries. They show that total expenditures and rent dissipation are often higher in lotteries
than in all-pay auctions if contestants have to consider a budget constraint. In another ar-
ticle, Che and Gale (1998b) analyze caps on political lobbying in an all-pay auction. They
conclude that the implementation of caps decreases total surplus and can have the counterin-
tuitive effect of increasing aggregate expenditures. On the other hand, Kaplan and Wettstein
(2006) argue that caps are not always fully enforced (e.g., in political competitions and
sports). Contestants can exceed caps by incurring a cost. In this case, Kaplan and Wettstein
conclude that a cap reduces expected bids but that the welfare of the bidders remains un-
changed. Gavious et al. (2002) study an all-pay auction with bid caps and privately informed
1Imperfect capital markets can arise due to asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (Hub-
bard 1998). Other reasons are transaction costs or tax advantages, such that external financing may be more
expensive than internal financing (Fazzari et al. 1988a, 1988b; Che and Gale 1998a). Foellmi and Oechslin
(2010), for instance, analyze the distributional effects of varied access to external finance.
2In the contest literature, different objectives of the contest organizer have been analyzed: one line of re-
search relates the contest organizer’s optimal behavior to maximize total expenditures (Che and Gale 1998b;
Dasgupta and Nti 1998; Moldovanu and Sela 2001, 2006; Nti 2004). Typical applications are contests, such
as sports competitions (where spectators enjoy top performances) and employment tournaments (where firms
prefer outstanding efforts of managers). Other research accounts for the further objectives of the contest or-
ganizer. Szymanski and Valletti (2005) argue that a contest organizer in sports, for instance, may also try
to balance contestants’ performances because spectators prefer balanced games. Competitive balance, there-
fore, fosters the uncertainty of outcome. This is the driver for game attention and the organizer’s revenue.
Szymanski and Valletti (2005) postulate that competitive balance can also be important in other industries.
For instance, governmental institutions organizing research tournaments may also be interested in balanced
competitions due to political constraints.
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bidders with respect to the prize valuation.3 In the case of linear or concave costs, they de-
rive that a cap reduces the average bid. However, in the case of convex costs, the average
bid possibly increases depending on the number of bidders and the degree of convexity in
the cost functions.
Meirowitz (2008) analyzes the effect of spending limits on candidates’ effort choice in
political campaigns. He concludes that the introduction of caps results in a game with mul-
tiple equilibria. Depending on the selected equilibrium, either the candidate with low effort
costs or the candidate with high effort costs has larger expected payoffs. In either equi-
librium, candidate payoffs are weakly increasing in the cap. Whereas Meirowitz assumes
that candidates have a different fundraising efficiency, Pastine and Pastine (2010a) consider
two additional sources of asymmetry: (i) an asymmetry with respect to the candidates’ ef-
fectiveness in campaign spending and (ii) an asymmetry due to an initial voter disposition
advantage. They show that the challenger benefits from a moderate limit under certain pre-
conditions. However, an even more restrictive limit can help the incumbent. The empirical
literature derives interesting results of spending limits: Levitt (1994) analyzes 633 elections
between 1972 and 1990 in the United States. He finds that spending limits provide a modest
advantage for the incumbent. Moreover, Gross et al. (2002) conclude that spending limits re-
duce the spending of the incumbent and the challenger in gubernatorial elections from 1978
to 1997 in the United States. Using data from 1997 to 2000, Milligan and Rekkas (2008)
find that higher spending caps lead to less close races in Canadian federal elections.
In this paper, we consider two asymmetric contestants (who we call the low-valuation
and high-valuation bidders) with different prize valuations investing to win an exogenous
prize. Simultaneously, a second asymmetry holds the following: investment is limited by
the contestant’s individual wealth. We analyze contestants’ optimal investment behaviors
and conclude that there are interesting interaction effects between these two asymmetries.
First, if at least one contestant has a liquidity constraint, aggregate investments are unam-
biguously lower compared to the case without constraints, even if the low-valuation bidder
possibly increases his/her investments. Second, the effect of a liquidity constraint on com-
petitive balance depends on the tightness or looseness of this constraint. Consequently, we
differentiate between strong and weak liquidity constraints. If the high-valuation bidder has
a strong (weak) liquidity constraint and therefore has a winning probability smaller (larger)
than 50% in equilibrium, then greater wealth implies more (less) competitive balance. Oth-
erwise, if the low-valuation bidder has a liquidity constraint, greater wealth unambiguously
increases competitive balance. Third, we get the following counterintuitive result in the case
of linear investment costs: if the low-valuation bidder has a liquidity constraint, the low-
valuation bidder’s payoff may increase as his/her liquidity constraint becomes more bind-
ing. The intuition is that both contestants decrease their investments if the low-valuation
bidder has less wealth. Therefore, investment externalities and costs decrease, such that the
low-valuation bidder’s payoff will increase.
In contrast to our model, contest models with liquidity constraints are primarily ana-
lyzed in a symmetric context. Che and Gale (1997) consider a contest model where con-
testants face individual liquidity constraints but have symmetric prize valuations. Che and
Gale (1998b), Gavious et al. (2002) as well as Pastine and Pastine (2010b) analyze bidders
3See also Pai and Vohra (2008) for optimal auctions with privately informed bidders regarding their valua-
tion. They discuss whether budget-constrained bidders should receive subsidies to effectively compete in the
auction. According to their model, incentive compatible instruments of subsidy are lump-sum transfers from
the auctioneer to the agents. In an optimal auction, however, the auctioneer should never offer subsidies to
the agents.
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with different prize valuations. However, their models are based on the assumption that con-
testants have a symmetric cap.4 On the other hand, Stein and Rapoport (2005) assume that
contestants have symmetric valuations of the prize as well as symmetric budgets. Our setting
enables us to fill the gap assuming asymmetric prize valuations as well as asymmetric liq-
uidity constraints. Applications with asymmetric prize valuations in which contestants have
individual liquidity constraints are lobbying for political rents, R&D races for patents, sports
competitions, firms’ competitions for market shares, and so forth. In all of these examples,
contestants usually have different budgets. In addition, contest prizes are valued differently
due to individual perceptions or different market potentials. Our analysis provides valuable
insights with respect to contestants’ investment behaviors and the derivation of welfare im-
plications in these circumstances.
This paper has the following structure: Sect. 2 sets up the model. As a benchmark, we
provide an analysis in the case without liquidity constraints in Sect. 3. The results with a
minimum of one liquidity constraint are presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 discusses the main
findings and provides applications.
2 Model
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a contest in which contestant i (i = 1,2) invests a nonnegative amount Ti to
increase his/her winning probability for an exogenous prize. The winning probability for
contestant i is given by the Tullock contest success function (Tullock 1980):5
pi(Ti, Tj ) = Ti
Ti + Tj for Ti + Tj > 0. (1)
We assume that the winning probability equals zero for each contestant if contestants do
not invest, that is, Ti = Tj = 0. Furthermore, we assume that contestant 1 values the prize
more highly than contestant 2. Therefore, the prize for contestant 1 is R1, and the prize for
contestant 2 is R2 with R1 > R2 > 0.6 Due to this asymmetry, we henceforth call contestant
1 the “high-valuation bidder” and contestant 2 the “low-valuation bidder”. Contestant 1
wins the prize R1 with probability p1(T1, T2) and contestant 2 the prize R2 with probability
p2(T1, T2) = 1 − p1(T1, T2).
Investment costs c(Ti) are weakly convex. If costs are strictly convex, we assume that
c′(Ti) > 0 for Ti > 0, c′(0) = 0 and c′′(Ti) > 0. If costs are linear, then the marginal costs of
4Che and Gale (1998b) argue that a maximum allowable cap symmetrically holds for each player in political
lobbying, motivated by the fact that campaign spending is often limited by law.
5Henceforth, i, j ∈ {1,2} and i = j if not otherwise quoted. Note that we will often present only contestant
i’s result. In this case, contestant j ’s result is given by changing subscripts.
6In the literature, the contest prize is often the same for each contestant. To achieve some kind of hetero-
geneity in contest models, contestants differ either in their technology or in a different valuation of the prize.
Differences in technology can be based on different productivities, i.e., even if contestants invest identical
amounts, the winning probability differs among contestants (Dixit 1987; Nti 1997, 2004; Yildirim 2005).
Unequal investment costs of agents are another example for different technologies (Szymanski and Valletti
2005). However, heterogeneity is sometimes modeled assuming different prizes or perceptions of the prize by
contestants (Baik and Kim 1997; Che and Gale 1998b). In this paper, we use the latter approach and assume
that (the value perception of) the contest prize differs between contestants.
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investment are denoted by the constant parameter θ with θ > 0. Fixed costs are normalized
to zero for each contestant. The expected payoff of contestant i is denoted by πi :7
πi = Ti
Ti + Tj Ri − c(Ti). (2)
We assume that contestants have limited access to capital. Therefore, contestant i’s in-
vestment is limited by his/her previously accumulated individual wealth Wi > 0, such that
c(Ti) ≤ Wi . If contestant i’s desired investment is larger than his/her wealth, then contes-
tant i is liquidity-constrained. Henceforth, a liquidity constraint means that this constraint
strictly binds. We assume that contestants are expected payoff maximizers. Moreover, indi-
vidual wealth levels as well as individual prize valuations are common knowledge.
We measure competitive balance (CB) by the ratio of the winning probabilities p1/p2.
If this ratio gets closer to one, competitive balance increases. Using equation (1), we obtain
the following relation for competitive balance:
CB ≡ p1(T1, T2)
p2(T1, T2)
= T1
T2
.
2.2 Optimality conditions
Contestant i has the following Lagrangian Li = pi(Ti, Tj )Ri − c(Ti) + λi[Wi − c(Ti)] with
multiplier λi to maximize expected payoffs. We get the following first-order condition using
Kuhn-Tucker:
Tj
(Ti + Tj )2 Ri = (1 + λi)c
′(Ti),
with Wi ≥ c(Ti). (3)
The complementary slackness condition is λi[Wi − c(Ti)] = 0. Next, two different scenarios
are considered. In the subsequent section, we assume that contestants do not face a liquidity
constraint. Afterwards, at least one contestant is constrained.
3 Unconstrained bidders
In this section, we consider wealthy contestants as a benchmark. Hence, neither of the two
contestants is considered to be liquidity-constrained.
3.1 Reaction functions
If costs are strictly convex, we get the following implicit reaction function for contestant i
(see Fig. 1a):
Tj
(Ti + Tj )2 Ri = c
′(Ti).
7In the literature, contestants’ payoff functions are sometimes modeled using a more general contest success
function pi(Ti , Tj ) = hi(Ti )/(hi (Ti ) + hj (Tj )) combined with linear costs. We use a reduced form of the
contest success function, however, in combination with nonlinear costs. Nti (1997: 45) argues that the two
frameworks lead to qualitatively similar results in the case without liquidity constraints.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1 a Unconstrained reaction functions with strictly convex costs. b Unconstrained reaction functions
with linear costs
Lemma 1 If costs are strictly convex: The reaction function Ti(Tj ) is strictly concave for
0 ≤ Ti ≤ Tj . Ti(Tj ) crosses the 45◦-line and achieves its maximum at point T ≡ Ti = Tj ,
implicitly defined by Ri/4 = c′(T )T . The reaction function has an inflection point defined
by 2R2i Ti = Ri(2Tj − 4Ti)(Ti + Tj )2c′′(Ti) and is convex for high investments of contestant
j , that is, Ri(2Tj − 4Ti)(Ti + Tj )2c′′(Ti) > 2R2i Ti .
Proof See Appendix 6.1. 
Public Choice (2012) 150:691–713 697
If costs are linear, contestant i has the following reaction function Ti(Tj ) (see Fig. 1b):
Ti(Tj ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
√
Tj Ri
θ
− Tj if 0 ≤ Tj ≤ Riθ ,
0 if Tj > Riθ .
Lemma 2 sums up the main properties of this reaction function:
Lemma 2 If costs are linear: The reaction function Ti(Tj ) is strictly concave for 0 ≤
Tj ≤ Ri/θ . Ti(Tj ) crosses the 45◦-line and achieves its maximum at point (Ti, Tj ) =
(Ri/(4θ),Ri/(4θ)).
Proof See Appendix 6.2. 
3.2 Equilibrium
We get the well-known result for linear as well as strictly convex costs in equilibrium: the
high-valuation bidder invests more (see point A in Figs. 1a and 1b) and has larger expected
payoffs than the low-valuation bidder because the high-valuation bidder has greater marginal
revenues (ceteris paribus).8
For linear costs, investment T ∗i and payoff π∗i for contestant i are as follows:
T ∗i =
R2i Rj
(Ri + Rj)2θ and π
∗
i =
R3i
(Ri + Rj)2 .
Note that the explicit derivation of investments and payoffs in equilibrium is only possible
in the case of linear costs.
4 Liquidity constraints
In the following three subsections, we consider a contest in which one or two contestants
are liquidity-constrained. First, we consider a liquidity constraint only for the high-valuation
bidder. Second, only the low-valuation bidder is constrained. Finally, both contestants have
a liquidity constraint.
4.1 Liquidity constraint for the high-valuation bidder
4.1.1 General cost function
Suppose that costs are either linear or strictly convex and only the high-valuation bidder is
liquidity-constrained. Therefore, point A in Figs. 1a and b cannot be achieved. The tight-
ness of the liquidity constraint determines which contestant invests more in equilibrium (see
Figs. 2a and b). If the high-valuation bidder’s wealth is relatively large (small), then he/she
invests more (less) than the low-valuation bidder.
Therefore, the following definition is introduced:
8The proof is provided in Appendix 6.3.
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Fig. 2 a Weak and strong
liquidity constraints for high-val.
bidder with strictly convex costs.
b Weak and strong liquidity
constraints for high-val. bidder
with linear costs
(a)
(b)
Definition 1 If the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained but invests more than
the low-valuation bidder in equilibrium, then we call this situation a “weak liquidity con-
straint” (WLC). Otherwise, if the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained and the low-
valuation bidder invests more than the high-valuation bidder in equilibrium, then we use the
term “strong liquidity constraint” (SLC).9
In equilibrium, we get Proposition 1:
9See Figs. 2a and b: if there is a WLC, the high-valuation bidder invests more than the low-valuation bidder
at equilibrium point B . If there is an SLC, the high-valuation bidder invests less than the low-valuation bidder
at equilibrium point C.
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Proposition 1 If only the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained in equilibrium:
(i) Aggregate investments are lower compared to the case without liquidity constraints.
(ii) A strong (weak) liquidity constraint for the high-valuation bidder implies a lesser
(greater) winning probability compared to the low-valuation bidder.
(iii) Increasing the high-valuation bidder’s wealth leads to more (less) competitive balance
if the high-valuation bidder has a strong (weak) liquidity constraint.
Proof See Appendix 6.4. 
(i) According to our model, if only the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained, ag-
gregate investments are unambiguously smaller compared to the case without liquidity
constraints, even if the low-valuation bidder potentially increases his/her investments.
Therefore, the low-valuation bidder’s investment increase never compensates for the
high-valuation bidder’s investment reduction. If the bidders’ investments are consid-
ered as rent-dissipation, then social welfare increases due to the lower aggregate in-
vestment.
(ii) A strong liquidity constraint for the high-valuation bidder implies that it is more likely
that the low-valuation bidder wins the contest. This result has important welfare impli-
cations because there is an inefficient prize allocation.
(iii) The effect of a relaxation of the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint on competi-
tive balance depends on the tightness of the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity restriction.
If the high-valuation bidder has only a weak liquidity constraint, a higher wealth W1 de-
creases competitive balance, as the high-valuation bidder increases his/her investment
and the low-valuation bidder simultaneously decreases his/her investment. Otherwise,
if the high-valuation bidder has a strong liquidity constraint, then the high-valuation
bidder invests less than the low-valuation bidder. In that case, a higher wealth W1 in-
creases the high-valuation bidder’s investments as well as those of the low-valuation
bidder. However, the high-valuation bidder proportionally increases his/her investments
more than the low-valuation bidder, such that competitive balance increases.
4.1.2 Linear costs
For linear costs, we get investments10
T ∗∗1 =
W1
θ
and T ∗∗2 =
√
W1
θ
(√
R2 −
√
W1
)
,
and payoffs11
π∗∗1 =
√
W1√
R2
R1 − W1 and π∗∗2 =
(√
R2 −
√
W1
)2
10To guarantee a positive investment as well as a non-binding constraint for the low-valuation bidder, we
need
√
R2 >
√
W1 as well as θT ∗∗2 =
√
W1(
√
R2 −
√
W1) ≤ W2.
11The high-valuation bidder’s profit is positive if π∗∗1 = R1
√
W1/
√
R2 − W1 > 0 ⇐⇒ R1
√
R2 >
√
W1R2.
Because the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained, we know that R1
√
R2 > (R1 + R2)
√
W1. This
condition guarantees that the high-valuation bidder’s profit is positive. Because the low-valuation bidder has
positive investments, we know that
√
R2 >
√
W1, such that π∗∗2 is also positive.
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in equilibrium. Therefore, whether the high-valuation or the low-valuation bidder has larger
investments and payoffs in equilibrium depends on the prizes R1, R2 and the high-valuation
bidder’s wealth W1. Note that the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint intersects the
low-valuation bidder’s reaction function exactly on the 45◦-line if 2
√
W1 = √R2. In that
case, contestants invest the same amount in equilibrium. A high W1 (such that 2
√
W1 >√
R2) implies that T ∗∗1 > T ∗∗2 , whereas a high R2 (such that 2
√
W1 <
√
R2) inflates the
reaction function T2(T1) yielding T ∗∗1 < T ∗∗2 in equilibrium.
Moreover, we are able to provide Proposition 2 for linear costs:
Proposition 2 If only the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained in equilibrium and
costs are linear: Increasing the high-valuation bidder’s wealth W1 leads to larger payoffs
for the high-valuation bidder.
Proof See Appendix 6.5. 
According to Proposition 2, relaxing the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint in-
creases the high-valuation bidder’s payoffs even if the low-valuation bidder’s investment
possibly increases in equilibrium in the case of linear costs.
4.2 Liquidity constraint for the low-valuation bidder
4.2.1 General cost function
Suppose that costs are either linear or strictly convex and only the low-valuation bidder is
liquidity-constrained. Again, point A in Figs. 1a and b cannot be achieved. Exchanging the
contestants’ subscripts, the results are analogous to the last subsection, where only the high-
valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained. However, we do not get a symmetric proposition
(see Figs. 3a and b):
Proposition 3 If only the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained in equilibrium:
(i) Aggregate investments are lower compared to the case without liquidity constraints.
(ii) The high-valuation bidder has a larger winning probability.
(iii) Increasing the low-valuation bidder’s wealth W2 leads to more competitive balance.
Proof See Appendix 6.6. 
(i) If only the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained, aggregate investments are un-
ambiguously smaller compared to the case without constraints. In contrast to the op-
posite case, in which only the high-valuation bidder has a constraint, both contestants
always decrease their investments. If the bidders’ investments are considered to be rent-
dissipation, then social welfare increases due to the lower aggregate investment.
(ii) According to Figs. 3a and b, the equilibrium is always above the 45-degree line. There-
fore, the high-valuation bidder has a larger winning probability in equilibrium.
(iii) A tighter liquidity constraint for the low-valuation bidder, that is, lower wealth W2,
implies less competitive balance. In contrast to the opposite case, in which only the
high-valuation bidder has a constraint (see Proposition 1), this effect is unambiguous.
Note that a greater (constrained) wealth of the low-valuation bidder increases the low-
valuation bidder’s as well as the high-valuation bidder’s investment in equilibrium.
However, the low-valuation bidder proportionally increases his/her investment more
than the high-valuation bidder, such that competitive balance increases.
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Fig. 3 a Liquidity constraint for
low-val. bidder with strictly
convex costs. b Liquidity
constraint for low-val. bidder
with linear costs
(a)
(b)
4.2.2 Linear costs
For linear costs, we get investments12
T ∗∗∗1 =
√
W2
θ
(√
R1 −
√
W2
)
and T ∗∗∗2 =
W2
θ
,
12To guarantee a positive investment as well as a non-binding constraint for the high-valuation bidder, we
need
√
R1 >
√
W2 as well as θT ∗∗∗1 =
√
W2(
√
R1 −
√
W2) ≤ W1.
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and payoffs13
π∗∗∗1 =
(√
R1 −
√
W2
)2
and π∗∗∗2 =
√
W2√
R1
R2 − W2
in equilibrium.
Moreover, we are able to provide Proposition 4:
Proposition 4 If only the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained in equilibrium and
costs are linear:
(i) Greater wealth W2 decreases the high-valuation bidder’s payoffs.
(ii) Greater wealth W2 increases the low-valuation bidder’s payoffs for R2
√
R1 >
2R1
√
W2.
(iii) Greater wealth W2 decreases the low-valuation bidder’s payoffs for
√
W2(R1 +R2) <
R2
√
R1 < 2R1
√
W2.
Proof See Appendix 6.7. 
(i) If the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained and costs are linear, a larger wealth
W2 decreases the high-valuation bidder’s payoff because revenues decrease and costs
increase.
However, it is possible that the low-valuation bidder’s payoffs are either increas-
ing or decreasing in his/her wealth. In either case, greater wealth of the low-valuation
bidder leads both contestants to invest more. Larger investments imply that marginal
revenues of the low-valuation bidder decrease according to the logit contest success
function.14
(ii) Greater wealth W2 implies that marginal revenues of the low-valuation bidder decrease
but are still larger than the constant marginal costs if R2
√
R1 > 2R1
√
W2, that is, for
relatively small wealth W2. Therefore, the low-valuation bidder’s expected payoff in-
creases.
(iii) Greater wealth W2 implies that marginal revenues of the low-valuation bidder de-
crease and become smaller than constant marginal costs if R2
√
R1 < 2R1
√
W2, i.e.,
for relatively large wealth W2. Therefore, the low-valuation bidder’s expected payoff
decreases. In this case, the low-valuation bidder prefers to have an even tighter con-
straint. A tighter liquidity constraint can help the low-valuation bidder because the
high-valuation bidder reacts by decreasing his/her investment. The low-valuation bid-
der’s expected revenues decrease, but costs decrease even more, such that the low-
valuation bidder’s expected payoff increases.
13The low-valuation bidder’s payoff is positive if π∗∗∗2 = R2
√
W2/
√
R1 −W2 > 0 ⇐⇒ R2
√
R1 >
√
W2R1.
Because the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained, we know that R2
√
R1 > (R1 + R2)
√
W2. This
condition guarantees that the low-valuation bidder’s payoff is positive. Because the high-valuation bidder has
positive investments, we know that
√
R1 >
√
W2, such that π∗∗∗1 is also positive.
14The intuition is as follows: larger investments T1 and T2 imply smaller marginal revenues for the low-
valuation bidder through two channels: First, through the cross-derivation
∂
∂(
T2
T1+T2 R2)
∂T2
∂T1
|T ∗∗∗1 ,T ∗∗∗2 < 0 and,
second, through
∂
∂(
T2
T1+T2 R2)
∂T2
∂T2
|T ∗∗∗1 ,T ∗∗∗2 < 0.
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4.3 Liquidity constraints for both bidders
4.3.1 General cost function
Suppose that costs are either linear or strictly convex and both contestants are liquidity-
constrained. Therefore, each contestant invests his/her entire wealth, such that T ∗∗∗∗1 =
c−1(W1) and T ∗∗∗∗2 = c−1(W2). We are able to derive Proposition 5:
Proposition 5 If both contestants are liquidity-constrained in equilibrium:
(i) The contestant with the larger wealth invests more.
(ii) Aggregate investments are smaller compared to the case without liquidity constraints.
Proof See Appendix 6.8. 
Note that equilibria with two liquidity-constrained contestants only exist within the
shaded lenses shown in Figs. 4a and b. Therefore, the intersections of any two liquidity
constraints within these lenses define an equilibrium.
(i) It is obvious that the contestant with greater wealth invests more.
(ii) Aggregate investments are unambiguously smaller compared to the case without con-
straints, even if the low-valuation bidder potentially increases his/her investment. Thus,
the possible increase in investment by the low-valuation bidder never compensates for
the high-valuation bidder’s investment reduction.
Generally, it is ambiguous whether competitive balance increases or decreases with two
liquidity constraints. However, it is easy to see that competitive balance is maximized for
symmetric constraints, i.e., CB = 1.
4.3.2 Linear costs
In equilibrium, we get the following payoff for contestant i if costs are linear:
π∗∗∗∗i = Wi
(
Ri
Wi + Wj − 1
)
.
Therefore, we are able to provide an additional Proposition 6 for linear costs:
Proposition 6 If both contestants are liquidity-constrained in equilibrium and costs are
linear:
(i) The high-valuation bidder’s payoff is greater compared to the low-valuation bidder’s
payoff if the high-valuation bidder’s wealth is at least as large as the low-valuation
bidder’s wealth.
(ii) The high-valuation bidder’s payoff is larger than the low-valuation bidder’s payoff for
W1(R1 −W1) > W2(R2 −W2), if the high-valuation bidder’s wealth is smaller than the
low-valuation bidder’s wealth.
(iii) The high-valuation bidder’s payoff is smaller than the low-valuation bidder’s payoff
for W1(R1 − W1) < W2(R2 − W2) if the high-valuation bidder’s wealth is lower than
the low-valuation bidder’s wealth.
Proof See Appendix 6.9. 
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4 a Liquidity constraints for low-val. and high-val. bidder with strictly convex costs. b Liquidity con-
straints for low-val. and high-val. bidder with linear costs
(i) As long as the high-valuation bidder’s wealth is at least as large as the low-valuation
bidder’s wealth, the high-valuation bidder’s payoff is higher, as the high-valuation bid-
der has a greater prize valuation.
(ii) If the high-valuation bidder has smaller wealth compared to the low-valuation bidder,
the high-valuation bidder overcompensates the lower wealth by a higher prize valua-
tion, such that the high-valuation bidder’s payoff is larger in equilibrium. This holds
for the parameter condition W1(R1 − W1) > W2(R2 − W2).
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(iii) If the high-valuation bidder has smaller wealth compared to the low-valuation bidder,
the low-valuation bidder overcompensates the smaller prize valuation by higher invest-
ments, such that the low-valuation bidder’s payoff is greater in equilibrium. This holds
for the parameter condition W1(R1 − W1) < W2(R2 − W2).
5 Discussion and applications
In this article, we analyze the optimal investment behavior in contests with asymmetric prize
valuations and individual liquidity constraints. We show that aggregate investments will be
smaller if at least one contestant is liquidity-constrained. Furthermore, welfare may increase
due to the presence of liquidity constraints because of reduced rent-dissipation. This result
applies to a large number of contests. Examples include rent-seeking and rent-defending
contests, lobbying, standards wars, arms races, litigation, political campaigns, mating con-
tests, conflict, R&D and patent races, sports tournaments, and competition for market shares.
In some industries, such as, pharmaceuticals, firms spend up to 40% of revenues for mar-
keting activities to increase their market shares (Huck et al. 2002). If these marketing ex-
penditures have no significant effect on overall market size, liquidity constraints will in-
crease overall welfare because they limit unproductive marketing expenditures. Salary caps
in professional team sports, limits in arms races, and restrictions on donations to political
campaigns have similar effects.
However, liquidity constraints are not always welfare enhancing, even when all contest
investments are unproductive. If the high-valuation bidder has a tighter constraint than the
low-valuation bidder, the welfare-enhancing reduction of rent-dissipation may be overcom-
pensated by an inefficient prize allocation due to an inefficiently large winning probability
of the low-valuation bidder. Consider a standards war in which a big company with deep
pockets has an inefficiently high probability of succeeding with an inferior standard against
a consortium of smaller competitors with a superior standard.
Furthermore, we show that the effect of liquidity constraints on competitive balance de-
pends on whether the high- or the low-valuation bidder is constrained. If the low-valuation
bidder is liquidity-constrained, a greater wealth of the low-valuation bidder will always
increase competitive balance. If the high-valuation bidder is constrained, the effect of a
larger wealth of the high-valuation bidder on competitive balance depends on the con-
straint. A strong (weak) liquidity constraint means that the high-valuation bidder has a larger
(smaller) winning probability than the low-valuation bidder in equilibrium. We conclude that
an increase of the high-valuation bidder’s wealth leads to more (less) competitive balance if
the high-valuation bidder has a strong (weak) liquidity constraint. This result is important for
contests in which value creation does not depend only on the allocation of the prize but also
on the level of competitive balance. A typical example is the professional team sports indus-
try. In this industry, contests are designed as championship races. Because value creation by
these championship races depends on the level of competitive balance, many leagues have
introduced salary caps or similar forms of liquidity constraints. These constraints are usually
designed as payroll caps that limit the maximum amount each team can spend on playing
talent. If the market shares of teams differ, however, the relationship between value creation
and competitive balance is not linear, but rather inversely U-shaped: more value is created if
the winning probability of large-market teams increases relative to the winning probability
of small-market teams until a maximum is reached. If the winning probability of the large
market team increases beyond this threshold, value creation starts to decrease. Leagues with
large asymmetries in market size of their teams have introduced exceptions to the salary
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constraints to allow large-market teams to increase their winning probability above 0.5. Un-
der the so-called Larry Bird rule, for example, the National Basketball Association enables
large-market teams to increase their winning probability by allowing teams to exceed the
cap when re-signing their star players.
In our view, the most interesting theoretical prediction of our model holds in contests
where the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained and costs are linear. In such a con-
test, a tighter constraint may increase the low-valuation bidder’s payoff. The intuition for this
counterintuitive result is as follows: a tighter constraint reduces the investment of the low-
valuation bidder. Because investments are strategic complements, the high-valuation bidder
will react by reducing his/her investment in equilibrium also. As a result, rent-dissipation
decreases and the expected payoffs of both contestants increase. Therefore, liquidity con-
straints may be surprisingly beneficial for bidders with low valuations. In political cam-
paigns, for example, the “underdog” may benefit from a budget cut because a smaller bud-
get of the constrained low-valuation politician will reduce optimal spending by the high-
valuation competitor. Even if this effect may result in a smaller winning probability of the
low-valuation politician, both contestants benefit from greater expected payoffs due to lower
investment costs.
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Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Contestant i has the following implicit reactions function for strictly convex costs:
Tj
(Ti + Tj )2 Ri = c
′(Ti).
It is easy to see that limTj →∞ Ti(Tj ) = 0. Therefore, contestant i’s best response is Ti = 0
if contestant j invests infinity. Using the implicit function theorem, we get
dTi
dTj
= Ri(Ti − Tj )
2RiTj + (Ti + Tj )3c′′(Ti) .
Note that the reaction function is increasing (decreasing) in Tj if Ti − Tj > 0 (Ti − Tj < 0).
The second derivative of the reaction function yields
d2Ti
dT 2j
= −2R
2
i Ti + Ri(2Tj − 4Ti)(Ti + Tj )2c′′(Ti)
[2RiTj (Ti + Tj )−1 + (Ti + Tj )2c′′(Ti)]2 .
Therefore, contestant i’s reaction function is concave if Ti < Tj because d
2Ti
dT 2
j
< 0. If
Ti = Tj , then contestant i’s reaction function reaches a maximum because dTidTj = 0 as well
as d
2Ti
dT 2
j
|Ti=Tj < 0. This maximum is implicitly defined by Ri/4 = T c′(T ). Contestant i’s
reaction function has an inflection point if the numerator of d2Ti/dT 2j equals zero, that is,
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2R2i Ti = Ri(2Tj −4Ti)(Ti +Tj )2c′′(Ti). Note that the reaction function achieves this inflec-
tion point after crossing the 45◦-line, such that this function becomes convex for even larger
Tj , that is, d
2Ti
dT 2
j
> 0.
6.2 Proof of Lemma 2
If costs are linear, then the first derivative of Ti(Tj ) with respect to Tj for 0 ≤ Tj ≤ Ri/θ
yields
∂Ti(Tj )
∂Tj
= 0.5
(
TjRi
θ
)−0.5
Ri
θ
− 1.
Therefore, we get
∂Ti(Tj )
∂Tj
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
> 0 if 0 ≤ Tj < Ri4θ ,
= 0 if Tj = Ri4θ ,
< 0 if Ri
θ
≥ Tj > Ri4θ .
The second derivative of the reaction function for 0 ≤ Tj ≤ Ri/θ yields
∂2Ti(Tj )
∂T 2j
= −0.25
(
Ri
θ
)0.5
T −1.5j < 0.
Therefore, the reaction function Ti(Tj ) is strictly concave for 0 ≤ Tj ≤ Ri/θ and i = 1,2.
Next, we derive the maximum of the reaction function:
∂Ti(Tj )
∂Tj
= 0 ⇐⇒ Tj = Ri4θ .
Note that if Tˆj = Ri/(4θ), then Ti(Tˆj ) = Ri/(4θ). Therefore, the reaction function Ti(Tj )
crosses the 45◦-line as well as achieves its maximum at point (Ti, Tj ) = (Ri/(4θ),Ri/(4θ))
for i = 1,2.
6.3 Proof of equilibrium with unconstrained bidders
Strictly convex costs: We have the following condition in equilibrium:
T ∗j Ri
T ∗i Rj
= c
′(T ∗i )
c′(T ∗j )
.
Note that the high-valuation bidder invests more in equilibrium. Proof by contradiction:
Suppose that T ∗j ≥ T ∗i . Then, the left-hand side of the last equation is larger than one due to
Ri > Rj . However, the right-hand side is lower than one because costs are strictly convex.
This result is not consistent with the left-hand side. Therefore, T ∗i > T ∗j in equilibrium.
The high-valuation bidder has larger expected payoffs in equilibrium. Proof by contra-
diction: Suppose that π¯j ≥ π¯i . Because T ∗i > T ∗j , contestant i can set Tˆi = T ∗j and will get
πi(Tˆi) > π¯j due to Ri > Rj . Therefore, πj ≥ πi is not consistent within an equilibrium.
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Linear costs: Combining (3), which holds for contestant 1 and 2, and setting λ1 = λ2 = 0
due to the complementary slackness condition, we get
T ∗1
T ∗2
= R1
R2
> 1.
Therefore, the high-valuation bidder invests more than the low-valuation bidder in equilib-
rium. Furthermore, dividing contestant 1’s payoff by contestant 2’s payoff in equilibrium,
we get
π∗1
π∗2
=
(
R1
R2
)3
> 1.
Therefore, the high-valuation bidder has greater expected payoffs than the low-valuation
bidder in equilibrium.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) If only the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained, λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0 due to
the complementary slackness condition. Then, we get the following two equilibrium
conditions:
W1 = c(T1) and
T1
(T1 + T2)2 R2 = c
′(T2).
Taking the derivative of T1 with respect to W1 for the first condition and using the
implicit function theorem for the second condition (derivative of T2 with respect to
W1), we get
d(T ∗∗1 + T ∗∗2 )
dW1
= (c
−1(W1) + T ∗∗2 )R2 + (c−1(W1) + T ∗∗2 )3c′′(T ∗∗2 )
2c−1(W1)R2 + (c−1(W1) + T ∗∗2 )3c′′(T ∗∗2 )
dc−1(W1)
dW1
> 0.
Because c(Ti) is a strictly increasing function, there exists an inverse function c−1
which is itself strictly increasing such that dc
−1(W1)
dW1
> 0. Furthermore, c′′(T2) > 0 for a
strictly convex cost function or c′′(T2) = 0 for a linear cost function. Therefore, aggre-
gate investments are increasing in W1 and therefore, aggregate investments are smaller
compared to the case without liquidity constraints.
(ii) Straightforward and therefore omitted.
(iii) Competitive balance CB = p1(T ∗∗1 , T ∗∗2 )/p2(T ∗∗1 , T ∗∗2 ) in equilibrium is given by
p1(T
∗∗
1 , T
∗∗
2 )
p2(T
∗∗
1 , T
∗∗
2 )
= T
∗∗
1
T ∗∗2
= c
−1(W1)
T ∗∗2 (W1)
,
and affected by a relaxation of the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint, that is,
an increase in W1, as follows:
∂(
p1(T
∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗
2 )
p2(T
∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗
2 )
)
∂W1
=
dc−1(W1)
dW1
T ∗∗2 − c−1(W1) dT2dW1
T ∗∗2
.
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Using the implicit function theorem, we get
dT2
dW1
= R2(T
∗∗
2 − c−1(W1))
2c−1(W1)R2 + (c−1(W1) + T ∗∗2 )3c′′(T ∗∗2 )
dc−1(W1)
dW1
,
and therefore
∂(
p1(T
∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗
2 )
p2(T
∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗
2 )
)
∂W1
> 0
⇔
(
T ∗∗2 − c−1(W1)
R2(T
∗∗
2 − c−1(W1))
2c−1(W1)R2 + (c−1(W1) + T ∗∗2 )3c′′(T ∗∗2 )
)
× dc
−1(W1)
dW1
> 0
⇔ c−1(W1)R2T ∗∗2 + (c−1(W1) + T ∗∗2 )3c′′(T ∗∗2 )T ∗∗2 + R2c−1(W1)2 > 0.
The last line is true because c−1(W1) is positive and c′′(T2) ≥ 0 by assumption.
If there is a weak liquidity constraint, then the high-valuation bidder invests more
than the low-valuation bidder in equilibrium, such that p1(T ∗∗1 , T ∗∗2 )/p2(T ∗∗1 , T ∗∗2 ) > 1.
A marginal increase in wealth for the high-valuation bidder leads to less competitive
balance (see point B in Figs. 2a and b). However, if there is a strong liquidity con-
straint, such that the high-valuation bidder invests less than the low-valuation bidder and
p1(T
∗∗
1 , T
∗∗
2 )/p2(T
∗∗
1 , T
∗∗
2 ) < 1, then a marginal increase in wealth for the high-valuation
bidder leads to more competitive balance (see point C in Figs. 2a and b).
Note that point B and C are stable equilibria, as (given the equilibrium investment T ∗∗2 of
the low-valuation bidder) the high-valuation bidder would prefer a larger investment, which
is not achievable due to his/her constraint. Furthermore, (given the equilibrium investment
T ∗∗1 of the high-valuation bidder), the low-valuation bidder’s investment is lying on his/her
reaction function. Therefore, neither the high-valuation bidder nor the low-valuation bidder
has an incentive to deviate from these equilibria (point B and C).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 2
If the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained and costs are linear, then a mar-
ginal increase in wealth for the high-valuation bidder increases his/her payoff π∗∗1 =√
W1R1/
√
R2 − W1 as follows:
∂π∗∗1
∂W1
= 0.5W
− 12
1√
R2
R1 − 1  0
⇐⇒ R1
√
R2  2R2
√
W1.
Because the high-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained, we know that
R1
√
R2 > (R1 + R2)
√
W1.
Using the last inequality and comparing it with ∂π∗∗1 /∂W1  0 ⇐⇒ R1
√
R2  2R2
√
W1,
we conclude that ∂π∗∗1 /∂W1 > 0 because R1 > R2. Therefore, the high-valuation bidder’s
payoff is increasing in W1 if costs are linear.
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6.6 Proof of Proposition 3
If only the low-valuation bidder is constrained, then the complementary slackness condition
implies λ2 > 0 and λ1 = 0.
(i) See Proof of Proposition 1(i) changing subscripts. Therefore, if only the low-valuation
bidder is liquidity-constrained, then aggregate investments are smaller compared to the
case without liquidity constraints.
(ii) Straightforward and therefore omitted.
(iii) Competitive balance CB = p1(T ∗∗∗1 , T ∗∗∗2 )/p2(T ∗∗∗1 , T ∗∗∗2 ) in equilibrium is given by
p1(T
∗∗∗
1 , T
∗∗∗
2 )
p2(T
∗∗∗
1 , T
∗∗∗
2 )
= T
∗∗∗
1
T ∗∗∗2
= T
∗∗∗
1 (W2)
c−1(W2)
,
and affected by a relaxation of the low-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint, that is,
an increase in W2, as follows:
∂(
p1(T
∗∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗∗
2 )
p2(T
∗∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗∗
2 )
)
∂W2
=
dT1
dW2
c−1(W2) − T ∗∗∗1 dc
−1(W2)
dW2
c−1(W2)2
.
Using the implicit function theorem, we get
dT1
dW2
= R1(T
∗∗∗
1 − c−1(W2))
2c−1(W2)R1 + (c−1(W2) + T ∗∗∗1 )3c′′(T ∗∗∗1 )
dc−1(W2)
dW2
,
and therefore
∂(
p1(T
∗∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗∗
2 )
p2(T
∗∗∗
1 ,T
∗∗∗
2 )
)
∂W2
< 0
⇔ −c
−1(W2)R1T ∗∗∗1 − R1c−1(W2)2 − T ∗∗∗1 (c−1(W2) + T ∗∗∗1 )3c′′(T ∗∗∗1 )
c−1(W2)2[2c−1(W2)R1 + (c−1(W2) + T ∗∗∗1 )3c′′(T ∗∗∗1 )
× dc
−1(W2)
dW2
< 0.
The last line is true because c−1(W1) is positive and c′′(T2) ≥ 0 by assumption. There-
fore, a larger W2 implies that the high-valuation bidder still invests more than the
low-valuation bidder in equilibrium, such that p1(T ∗∗∗1 , T ∗∗∗2 )/p2(T ∗∗∗1 , T ∗∗∗2 ) > 1. But
competitive balance increases, that is, p1(T ∗∗∗1 , T ∗∗∗2 )/p2(T ∗∗∗1 , T ∗∗∗2 ) decreases be-
cause the low-valuation bidder proportionally increases his/her investment more than
the high-valuation bidder.
Note that point B is a stable equilibrium in Figs. 3a and b, because (given the equilibrium
investment T ∗∗∗1 of the high-valuation bidder) the low-valuation bidder would prefer a higher
investment than T ∗∗∗2 , which is not achievable due to his/her constraint. Furthermore, (given
the equilibrium investment T ∗∗∗2 of the low-valuation bidder), the high-valuation bidder’s
investment is lying on his/her reaction function. Therefore, neither the high-valuation bidder
nor the low-valuation bidder has an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium.
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6.7 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) It is easy to see that π∗∗∗1 = (
√
R1 −√W2)2 is decreasing in W2. Note that √R1 > √W2
because the high-valuation bidder’s investments are positive.
If the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained and costs are linear, then a mar-
ginal increase in wealth for the low-valuation bidder can increase or decrease his/her
payoffs π∗∗∗2 =
√
W2R2/
√
R1 − W2:
∂π∗∗∗2
∂W2
= 0.5W
− 12
2√
R1
R2 − 1  0
⇐⇒ R2
√
R1  2R1
√
W2.
Because the low-valuation bidder is liquidity-constrained, we know that
R2
√
R1 >
√
W2(R1 + R2).
Using the last inequality and comparing it with ∂π∗∗∗2 /∂W2  0 ⇐⇒ R2
√
R1 
2R1
√
W2, we conclude that
(ii) ∂π∗∗∗2 /∂W2 > 0 if R2
√
R1 > 2R1
√
W2.
(iii) However, ∂π∗∗∗2 /∂W2 < 0 if
√
W2(R1 + R2) < R2√R1 < 2R1√W2 because R1 > R2
by assumption. Therefore, it is possible that the low-valuation bidder’s payoffs are
decreasing in W2.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Suppose that both contestants are liquidity-constrained. Due to the complementary
slackness condition, we get λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 and therefore T ∗∗∗∗1 = c−1(W1) and
T ∗∗∗∗2 = c−1(W2). Then, contestant i invests more than contestant j in equilibrium, if
T ∗∗∗∗i = c−1(Wi) > c−1(Wj ) = T ∗∗∗∗j
⇐⇒ Wi > Wj .
Thus, the contestant with the greater wealth has larger investments in equilibrium.
(ii) According to the proofs of propositions (1) and (3), aggregate investments on the lens
boundary and thus also within the lens are smaller compared to the case without liquid-
ity constraints.
6.9 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) If the high-valuation bidder’s wealth is at least as large as the low-valuation bidder’s
wealth, then we have the following restrictions, which must hold in equilibrium with
two liquidity constraints:
I: W1 ≥ W2 > 0 (by assumption)
II: R1 > R2 > 0 (by assumption)
III: R2 > W1 + W2 (required for positive payoffs).
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If these three restrictions hold, it follows that π∗∗∗∗1 > π∗∗∗∗2 ⇐⇒ W1(R1 − W1) >
W2(R2 − W2). Therefore, if the high-valuation bidder’s wealth is at least as large as
the low-valuation bidder’s wealth, then the high-valuation bidder’s payoff is greater
compared to the low-valuation bidder’s payoff.
(ii) Suppose that W2 > W1 > 0. Then, the high-valuation bidder’s payoff is larger than the
low-valuation bidder’s payoff if π∗∗∗∗1 > π∗∗∗∗2 ⇐⇒ W1(R1 − W1) > W2(R2 − W2).
(iii) On the other hand, the high-valuation bidder’s payoff is smaller than the low-valuation
bidder’s payoff if π∗∗∗∗1 < π∗∗∗∗2 ⇐⇒ W1(R1 − W1) < W2(R2 − W2).
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